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law, he is entitled to most of the procedural advantages accorded the rich. This
does not accord with the values of a society which is vitally concerned about
deprivation of civil rights. Moreover, the judiciary has expressed disatisfaction with
the definition of "criminal cases," by extending it to include proceedings, traditionally civil in natures 5 where a defendant's liberty is threatened.
Allowing a right to free transcript in civil cases would increase the financial
burden on a county. But some of the cost may be recovered. If an indigent were
successful in securing and collecting a monetary judgment, the expense of a
transcript could be charged as part of his court costs. 76 In any case, the legislature
should re-evaluate its determination of who is entitled to the full and adequate
appeal which often only a transcript can provide.
Ronald E. Mallen*
75 See Justice Edmonds' dissents in Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270
P.2d 1025 (1954) (sexual psychopathy hearing) and in In re Paiva, 31 Cal. 2d 503,
190 P.2d 604 (1948) (coram nobis hearing).
76 This is done in New York. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1102(d).
0
Member, Second Year Class.

RETROACTIVITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
Within the last few years the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the concept
of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to a person accused of crime. Extending established federal rules to proceedings in state courts, the Court has said:
that evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is not admissible;' that the
privilege against self-incrimination is now available; 2 and, as a corollary of this
privilege, that neither the judge nor the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to testify. 3 The Court has' also applied the sixth amendment's
guarantee of counsel to the states and broadened the right, holding that an accused
is entitled to counsel not only at his trial but, on request, as soon as the proceedings
focus upon him as a suspect. 4 In spite of public protest that the criminal is being
protected at the expense of public safety, the Supreme Court has deemed it
necessary for the assurance of due process of law that these protections be
accorded to every accused.
These new decisions raise the question of whether they are to be applied to
cases finally decided 5 before the new extensions were announced. An indication
as to retroactive application in the majority opinion itself would be controlling, but
1Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
4 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5 A conviction has become "final" when the judgment has been rendered, availability
of appeal has been exhausted, and time for petition for certiorari has elapsed. Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965).
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usually such indication does not appear, leaving it to the lower courts to determine
6
the intention of the Supreme Court.
At one time in our judicial history, the question of retroactive application
presented little problem to the courts. Following Blackstone's view that the judge
was not the creator of the law but only its discoverer, the courts saw an overruled
decision as a failure at discovering the true law, while an overruling decision was
not new law but a statement of what had always been the law.7 Under this
concept, every new decision was "retroactive," since it had always been the law.
Blackstone's view has since been discarded by many of our courts, which are now
of the opinion that an overruled decision should be recognized as governing for
the period it was in effect.8 This view would normally preclude retroactive

application of a new decision.
Linkletter v. Walker

Somewhere between these two views is that taken by the Supreme Court in
Linkletter v. Walker,9 that the Court is "neither required to apply, nor prohibited
from applying a decision retrospectively... [but] must ...weigh the merits and
demerits in each case ....10
The problem of determining whether a decision is to have prospective or
retroactive effect is illustrated by Mapp v. Ohio," which applied to state courts
the rule excluding evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure. For four years
after this decision, neither the courts1 2 nor writers' 3 could agree on its retroactivity.
6 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11, 15 (5th Cir.
1963), aff'd, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling
Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 668-71 (1962).
7 See 1 BIACKSTONE, CocmimrAm s* 69-70; GRAY, NATtuR AmE Sotmcz OF =HE
LAw 222 (2d ed. 1921).
8 See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1965); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940); United States ex rel. Angelet
v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 311 U.S. 654 (1965); Gaitan v. United
States, 317 F.2d 494, 497-98 (10th Cir. 1963). See generally Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 909, 916-21

(1962).
9381 U.S. 618 (1965). This is the first case in which the Supreme Court has
refused to apply a constitutional decision retroactively. Id. at 628.
10 Id.at 629.

1367 U.S. 643 (1961).

12

Cases holding Mapp retroactive: Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963);
Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 760 (1965). Cases holding Mapp not to be retroactive: Sisk v. Lane, 331 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 380
U.S. 959 (1965); United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964),
aff'd, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963);
United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
'sArticles concluding that Mapp is retroactive: Currier, Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Meador, Habeas
Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964); Torcia & King,
The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 Dicx. L. REv.

269 (1962). Articles concluding that Mapp is not retroactive: Bender, The Retroactive
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In Linkletter, the Supreme Court settled the controversy, declaring that Mapp was
not retroactive, and, in answering that question, applied guidelines which may be
useful in determining the retroactivity of other decisions.
In addition to these guidelines, the Court also considered whether Mapp was
concerned with the fairness of the trial and decided that it was not.14 It compared
Mapp to decisions to which retroactive application had been given and said:
[In each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively
the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity
of the fact-finding process. Here, as we have pointed out, the fairness of the trial
is not under attack. All the petitioner attacks is the admissibility of evidence, the
reliability and relevancy of which is not questioned .... In Griffin v. People of
State of Illinois, [351 U.S. 12] ... the appeal which was denied because of lack
of funds was "an integral part of the [State's] trial system for finally adjudicating
the guilt or innocence of a defendant." . . . Precluding an appeal because of

inability to pay was analogized to denying the poor a fair trial. In Gideon v.
Wainwright ...

[372 U.S. 335] ...

we recognized a fuidamental fact that a

layman, no matter how intelligent, could not possibly forward his claims of
innocence, and violation of previously declared rights adequately. Because of this
the judgment lacked reliability. In Jackson v. Denno ... [387 U.S. 368] . . . the
holding went to the basis of fair hearing and trial because the procedural
apparatus never assured thedefendant a fair determinationof voluntariness.15

The implication is that if the fairness of the trial had been in question, Mapp
would have been applied retroactively. The tone of the opinion makes it clear,
though it does not expressly so state, that reliability of the guilt-determining
process must be assured before the Court will look at the possibility of purely
prospective application of a constitutional decision.
The guidelines to be applied, once the question of fairness is settled, are: the
prior history of the rule in question; the reliance placed on the old doctrine; the
purpose of the new rule and the effect retroactive application would have on this
purpose; and the effect it would have on the administration of justice. 16
Prior History. In 1949, the Supreme Court had specifically refused to make
the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence binding upon the states17 and had
since refused to change this position.' 8
Reliance on the Old Rule. Relying on the fact that the Supreme Court had
consistently refused to overrule its position, the states continued to use illegallyEffect of an Overruling Decision; Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962);
Freund, New Vistas in ConstitutionalLaw, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1964); Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 Rocxy MT. L. Rv.
150 (1962); Note, CollateralAttack of Pre-Mapp v. Ohio Convictions Based on Illegally
Obtained Evidence in State Courts, 16 RuTGEns L. REv. 587 (1962); Note, Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Aprplication in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
14 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
15 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 & n.20 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
16 Id. at 629, 636.
17 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18

(1951).

See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117
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obtained evidence in their courts and secured countless convictions on the basis
of such evidence.19
Purpose and Effectuation of Purpose. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is
that of deterrence-to discourage the police from violating an individual's constitutional rights in order to obtain evidence. 20 If the evidence so obtained is
excluded from the courts, the incentive for the violation no longer exists. 21 This
deterrent purpose would in no way be served by releasing guilty prisoners con22
victed before the rule became effective.
Effect on the Administration of Justice. Because only twenty-six states followed the exclusionary rule at the time of the Mapp decision, 28 retroactive application would presumably result in retrial of a large number of prisoners, placing a great burden on the courts and seriously disrupting the judicial system.
The Court decided, on -the basis of these tests, that Mapp would not be applied retroactively.
The dissent urged that the court should not have ignored the inequality resulting from discrimination between prisoners whose convictions had become
final before the Mapp rule was announced and those whose convictions had not
then become final.2 However, to use this standard is to return to the days of
Blackstone's "automatic retroactivity," for the only way to attain equality of application is to make every decision retroactive.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide the retroactivity of the rules of
26
but, in Linkletter, it has proEscobedo v. lllinois25 and Grifflin v. California,
2
vided the tools needed to construct the likely result.

7

19 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). At the time of the Mapp
decision, twenty-four states did not follow the exclusionary rule. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, Appendix, 224-32 (1960). Some states, California included, did adopt the
exclusionary rule between 1949, the time of the Wolf decision, and 1961, the time of the
Mapp20decision. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in
the Federal
Courts, 71 YAIE L.J. 907, 942 (1962).
21
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
22
See Bender, supra note 13, at 661; Traynor, supra note 13, at 341; Note, Prospective Overruling and RetroactiveApplication in the FederalCourts, 71 YALE L.J. 907,
942 (1962).
23
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, Appendix, 224-32 (1960).
24 381 U.S. at 641-42 (1965). The discrimination was particularly striking here, as
Linkletter's offense actually was committed more than a year after Miss Mapp's. Ibid. See
also California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 760 (1965);
Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, 496 (4th Cir. 1963); Bender, supra note 13, at 675-77;
Currier, supra note 13, at 237; Torcia & King, supra note 13.
25 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Other courts have considered Escobedo's retroactivity.
Cases holding or asserting that Escobedo is retroactive are: United States ex rel. Walker
v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965) (dictum); Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44
(D. Neb. 1964). Cases holding that Escobedo is not retroactive are: United States ex rel.
Walden v. Pate (7th Cir., July 27, 1965); Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120 (N.D.
Cal. 1965), appeal docketed, No. 20304, 9th Cir., Aug. 12, 1965; United States ex rel.
Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. IlM. 1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206
A.2d 737 (1965).
26380 U.S. 609 (1965).
27

These guidelines have already been utilized in Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp.
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Escobedo v. Illinois
In Escobedo, the Supreme Court held that a person in custody is entitled
to counsel upon request as soon as the proceeding becomes accusatory and
focuses upon him as a suspect, and the police have begun a process of interrogation. A confession elicited from him after denial of his request for counsel is
28
inadmissible.
Like Mapp, Escobedo is not aimed at making trial procedure more reliable. 29
The prohibition is against the use of voluntary confessions and incriminating
statements-the use of involuntary confessions has long been prohibited.3 °
Like the illegally seized evidence of the Mapp -case, the voluntary confessions
proscribed by Escobedo were in all probability, true. With few exceptions, an
innocent person does not voluntarily confess to a crime he did not commit.
Since the truthfulness of the confession is not involved, the beneficiaries of retroactivity would be guilty prisoners. The compelling reason for retroactivityquestionable reliability of the guilt-determining process-being absent, it is
necessary to apply the tests evolved in Linkletter.
Prior History. The extension of the right to counsel announced by Escobedo
was a completely new rule-a provision which went beyond any such protections given in the past in either state or federal courts.3 '
Reliance on the Old Rule. There is an even stronger case for reliance of
state officials here than in the Mapp situation. State officials were aware that
the illegal searches and seizures were not condoned in federal courts, but the
Supreme Court had given no hint that refusal to allow an accused to see a
120 (N.D. Cal. 1965), appeal docketed, No. 20304, 9th Cir., Aug. 12, 1965, and In re
Gaines, 63 A.C. 235, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865, 404 P.2d 473 (1965).
28 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937 (1965), extended the rule of Escobedo by a holding that the accused need
not request counsel; the police must advise him of his right to counsel and to remain
silent, or a confession subsequently elicited will not be admissible. In re Lopez, 62
Cal. 2d 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965), held that Dorado was not
retroactive. Since the California Supreme Court, in Dorado, regarded the result there
reached as required by the language of Escobedo, Lopez amounts to a holding that
Escobedo is not retroactive.
29 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1965), appeal docketed,
No. 20304, 9th Cir., Aug. 12, 1965; United States ex rel. Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp.
237, 240 (N.D. Ill. 1965); In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 377, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194,
398 P.2d 380, 386 (1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 585-87, 206 A.2d 737, 744-45
(1965).
8
OLisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (involuntary confession); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confession).
31 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1965), appeal docketed,
No. 20304, 9th Cir., Aug. 12, 1965. But see the following cases which indicate a trend
toward this new extension: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (guidance of counsel
necessary at every step of proceedings); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)
(right to counsel during interrogation after indictment in state proceeding); Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (accused entitled to counsel at arraignment); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (applied Spano rule to any interrogation after
indictment).
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and the police
lawyer at this point in the proceedings was3 unconstitutional,
2
consequently felt free to make such a refusal.
Purpose and Effectuation of Purpose. The purpose of the Escobedo rule is
deterrence-to prevent police from procuring voluntary confessions by denying
the accused the right to have an attorney present 83 This purpose of deterrence
will not be furthered by the release of guilty prisoners.3 4
Effect on the Administration of Justice. It is probable that relatively few
prisoners would be released by retroactive application of Escobedo because few
suspects being interrogated request counsel-and if suspects have requested
counsel at this point, it is possible that police have granted their requests. If,
however, the Court should accept the California extension of the Escobedo
rule, to the effect that police officers must inform a suspect of his right to counsel
at this point,3 5 retroactive application would cause a flood of retrials, because
this is a new requirement seldom practiced by the police before.
Although retroactive application of Escobedo, without further extension,
would probably not upset the administration of justice, the combination of
the other factors-a completely new rule, justified reliance on the old rule, and
a deterrent purpose which would not be served by retroactive applicationleads to the conclusion that Escobedo should not be applied retroactively.
Griffin v. California
Since 1934, California has had a constitutional provision which says, in
part: "[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or to deny any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the
court or the jury."36 In the recent case of Griffin v. California37 the Supreme Court
held that such comment on a defendant's failure to testify was a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment.33
Unlike Mapp and Escobedo, Griffin is concerned with a rule which directly
involves the reliability of the fact-finding process. "It is in substance a rule
of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering to the jury for
32 Carrizosa v. Wilson, supra note 31, at 125; State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 589, 206
A.2d 737, 746 (1965).
33See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964); United States ex rel.
Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237, 240 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Carrizosa v. Wilson, supra
note 31, at 124-25; In re Lopez; 62 Cal. 2d 368, 372-73, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 191, 398
P.2d 380, 383, 388 (1965). But see Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44, 45 (D.
Neb. 1964).
34 See Carrizosa v. Wilson, supra note 31, at 126; United States ex rel. Conroy v.
Pate, supra note 33, at 240.
35 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937 (1965).
' 6CAL. CoNsT., art. 1, § 13 (initiative amendment 1dopted Nov. 6, 1934). Six
states (Cal., Conn., Iowa, N.J., N.M., Ohio) permitted such comment at the time of
the Griffin decision. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965); 8 WIGMORE,
EvMENCE § 2272 n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 1964).
87 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
38 Id. at 613.
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its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof
is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and the court's
acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance." 9
The law presumes a defendant innocent until proven guilty4 0 and the effect
of such comment is to induce the jury to ignore that presumption. 41 There
are reasons other than guilt that may cause a defendant to choose not to
take the stand. For example, he may have a record of past convictions which
he does not wish to be brought to the attention of the jury on cross-examination. 42 Or he may be extremely nervous and fears his demeanor on the witness
stand would be damaging to his case.48 The jury should not assume the defendant's guilt from his failure to testify, but comment by the prosecutor and
the court, solemnizing the silence of the accused into evidence against him, 44
certainly will lead to this result. The unfairness of such comment can perhaps
best be illustrated by the instructions to the jury in the Griffin case:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably
be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he
does, not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such
evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate
the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may
be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the
more probable. 45
It is evident that the Court in Griffin felt that such a practice led to an unfair
trial and the result that an innocent person might be convicted under it. Since
the 'reliability of the guilt-determining process when comment is allowed is
questionable, Griffin should be applied retroactively.
Retroactive application will certainly receive a cool reception in California,
where prosecutors and judges have been routinely making such comment for the
last thirty years. Undoubtedly, there are countless people in California prisons
who were convicted in trials which were infected by such comment. Although
retroactive application will put a tremendous burden on the courts of the states
which have allowed comment, this practical consideration cannot be allowed
89

Id. at 613.

40

CAL. PEN. CODE §

1096.

41

Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
42
Evidence of other crimes committed by defendant is obviously prejudicial to him
and, with certain exceptions, is irrelevant to the question of whether he committed the
offense charged in the indictment under which he is being tried. Therefore, it is normally
inadmissible on that issue. However, when defendant takes the stand, he subjects himself
to cross-examination, giving the prosecutor an opportunity to impeach his credibility.

Like that of any other witness, his credibility may be impeached by showing that he
has been convicted of crimes which cast doubt on his veracity as a witness. The danger
is that the jury, even if given a cautionary instruction, will not consider defendant's
record merely as bearing on his credibility, but will improperly regard it as showing
a propensity to commit crimes-including the crime for which he is being tried. 3
WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 889-91 (3d ed. 1941).

48See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893); 8 WiGoMRE, EvIDENCE
§ 2272 n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
44 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
45 Id. at 610.
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to overshadow the fact that the fairness of these prisoners' trials is in question
and that some of them may have been wrongly convicted. 46 In indicating that
decisions which deal directly with the fairness of the trial must be applied
retroactively, the Supreme Court has not balked at the prospect of overcrowded
courts, and the other problems, such as availability of witnesses, inherent in retrying cases after many years have elapsed. Consider the case of Gideon v.
Wainwright,47 retroactive application of which has resulted in retrials for thousands of prisoners, with the prospect of many more retrials still to come.
Perhaps the spectre of retrying countless prisoners caused the California
Supreme Court to ignore the aspect of the fairness of the trial and to decide,
In re Gaines,48 that Griffin is not retroactive.
The California court in In re Lopez stated:
[N]ew interpretations of constitutional rights have been and should be applied
retroactively only in those situations in which such new rules protect the defendant against the possibility of conviction of a crime he did not commit ....
Without discussion, the United States Supreme Court has applied retroactively
on collateral attack its decisions requiring procedural fairness at criminal proceedings ....
To reject the retroactivity of [these] . . . constitutional rights
would be to sanction the continued incarceration of a defendant despite errors
at the trial which, upon correction, could well establish his innocence. 49
It is difficult to see how the California court, faced with the Supreme Court
decision that the California comment rule resulted in an unfair trial, and with
its own statement that if fairness of trial is in issue a decision must be retroactive,
could have dismissed the fairness issue in one sentence in its determination of
retroactivity. 59 Its abrupt statement that the comment does not affect the fairness of the trial is directly contrary to constitutional interpretation by the Supreme
Court. At one point in the Gaines decision, the court said that the jury's inference of guilt from failure to testify is natural and is not magnified by commentri--completely ignoring the fact that Griffin considered and rejected this
very point. It is submitted that the California Supreme Court's decision is contrary not only to the United States Supreme Court's determination that the comment results in an unfair trial but also to its own position that the question of
fairness must be carefully considered and, if fairness of the trial is involved, the
decision must be given retroactive application.
Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing, the following conclusions emerge. The Supreme
Court will not automatically give retroactive application, even in criminal cases,
to every decision recognizing or establishing a new constitutional right, but
will distinguish between two broad categories of constitutional rights. The first
category consists of those rights which guarantee to every accused that the
40

See, e.g., Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, 495 (4th Cir. 1963); Torcia & King,
supra note 13, at 287.
47372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48 63 A.C. 235, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865, 404 P.2d 473 (1965).
49 62 Cal. 2d at 372, 376-77, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 191, 194, 398 P.2d at 383, 386.
50
In re Gaines, 63 A.C. 235, 238, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867, 404 P.2d 473, 475 (1965).
51 Id. at 240-41, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 868, 404 P.2d at 476.

